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Abstract
Due to great eort from mathematicians, physicists and computer scientists, network
science has attained rapid development during the past decades. However, because of the
complexity, most researches in this area are conducted only based upon experiments and
simulations, it is critical to do research based on theoretical results so as to gain more
insight on how the structure of a network aects the security. This dissertation introduces
some stochastic and statistical models on certain networks and uses a k-out-of-n tolerant
structure to characterize both logically and physically the behavior of nodes. Based upon
these models, we draw several illuminating results in the following two aspects, which are
consistent with what computer scientists have observed in either practical situations or
experimental studies.
Suppose that the node in a P2P network loses the designed function or service when
some of its neighbors are disconnected. By studying the isolation probability and the
durable time of a single user, we prove that the network with the user's lifetime having
more NWUE-ness is more resilient in the sense of having a smaller probability to be iso-
lated by neighbors and longer time to be online without being interrupted. Meanwhile,
some preservation properties are also studied for the durable time of a network. Addition-
ally, in order to apply the model in practice, both graphical and nonparametric statistical
methods are developed and are employed to a real data set.
On the other hand, a stochastic model is introduced to investigate the security of
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network systems based on their vulnerability graph abstractions. A node loses its designed
function when certain number of its neighbors are compromised in the sense of being taken
over by the malicious codes or the hacker. The attack compromises some nodes, and the
victimized nodes become accomplices. We derived an equation to solve the probability
for a node to be compromised in a network. Since this equation has no explicit solution,
we also established new lower and upper bounds for the probability.
The two models proposed herewith generalize existing models in the literature, the
corresponding theoretical results eectively improve those known results and hence carry
an insight on designing a more secure system and enhancing the security of an existing
system.
Key words: Durable time; Exponential distribution;
Harmonic mean; Increasing convex order;
Isolation probability; Jackkning;
k-out-of-n; NWUE;
Pareto distribution; Power law distribution;
Stochastic orders; Random graph;
TTT plot; U-statistic
AMS 1991 Subject Classication: Primary 60E15, Secondary 60K10
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1Introduction and Preliminaries
1.1 Introduction
Computer and network security has become a rather popular and important topic in
the past two decades. A simple Google search based on the keyword \computer and
network security" showed 27.8 million items on September 25, 2014. In general, network
security mainly aims to protect the entire infrastructure of a network system as well
as its corresponding services from unauthorized access. There are several fundamental
components in network security:
(i) Security-specic infrastructures, such as hardware- and software-based re-walls and
physical security approaches;
(ii) Security polices, which include security protocols, users authentications, authoriza-
tions, access controls, information integrity and condentiality;
(iii) Detection of malicious programs, including anti-viruses, worms, or Trojan horses,
and spyware or malware;
(iv) Intrusion detection and prevention, which encompasses network trac surveillance
and analyzing and proling user behavior.
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Since the topic of network security links a great number of research areas and disci-
plines, we will investigate the role the infrastructures of a network plays in the system's
security based upon some stochastic models. For an overall introduction on network se-
curity, including key tools and technologies used to secure network access, please refer to
Malik (2003) and Laet and Schauwers (2005).
1.1.1 Peer to peer network
As a decentralized structure, a Peer-to-Peer (P2P) computer network utilizes diverse
connectivity among users participating a network and the cumulative bandwidth of them
rather than conventional centralized resources where a relatively low number of servers
play the key role in providing a service or application.
P2P networks, which are usually used for connecting nodes through largely ad hoc
connections, are useful for many purposes. Sharing content les containing audio, video,
data or anything in digital format and real time data. P2P networks can be classied by
what they can be used for: (i) le sharing, (ii) telephony, (iii) media streaming (audio,
video), and (iv) discussion forums etc.
A pure P2P network does not have any clients or servers but only equal peer nodes
that function as both \clients" and \servers" simultaneously to the other nodes in the
network (see Figure 1.1.1). This structure of network diers from the client-server model
where communication is mostly between the node and a central server (see Figure 1.1.1).
As a typical example, an FTP server transfers le in a manner totally dierent from
that a P2P network does. Actually, the client and server programs in an FTP server are
quite distinct, the clients initiate the download/uploads, and the servers oer the service
according to these requests.
Besides the pure P2P network, there are quite a lot of Hybrid P2P networks. For
example, as a distributed discussion system, the Usenet news server system also adopts
2
Figure 1.1: A server based network
Figure 1.2: A P2P based network
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a client-server form. To disseminate Usenet news articles over the entire Usenet network,
news servers communicated with each other. However, the news server system acts in
a client-server style when individual users access a local news server to deal with news.
As another example, in an SMTP email system, the core email relaying network of mail
transfer agents from a P2P model while the periphery of Mail user agents and their
direct connections is client-server. On the other hand, some other networks, for example,
Napster, OpenNAP and IRC, use a client-server structure for some tasks (e.g. searching)
and a P2P structure for others.
Currently, P2P structure rapidly evolves and is widely used in distributed networks
not only computer to computer but also human to human. Without any server, a node in
P2P network mainly relies upon connections from its neighbors to operate correctly and
losing some connections implies the failure of this node, it is very important to study its
resilience and reliability. Leonard et al (2007) built the lifetime model for a P2P network,
it is assumed that the node is isolated when it is physically disconnected from all its
neighbors, that is, all connections are broken. In Chapter 2, we study the resilience of
the pure P2P network through a new lifetime model, which is a generalization of that
proposed by Leonard et al (2007) in the sense that a node loses the function and service
if and only if some of its neighbor nodes are disconnected, this enable the new model
to include both physical and logical isolation and hence to be more useful in practical
situations. We derive the probability for a node to be isolated and the expected dural
time, and show that the more heavier the tail of probability of the lifetime is, the more
resilient the P2P network is.
1.1.2 Vulnerable network
With the rapid development of computer, this world gets more involved into networks.
As a result, any minor failure in a network that you participate may collapse the whole
4
network and hence result in hazardous loss in business. In fact, the past two decades
witnessed numerous such kind of cases. This fundamentally attributes to vulnerability of
networks and it is rather urgent to study the network security so as to eectively defense
the network from being invaded.
Network security usually consists of those provisions made in an underlying computer
network topology, policies adopted by the network administrator to protect the network,
the network-accessible resources from unauthorized access, and consistent and continuous
monitoring to measure its eectiveness.
Figure 1.3: A depiction of a vulnerable network with security components
Network security originates from authenticating all user a username and a password.
After the authentication, a re wall is employed to enforce access policies which control
legal services to be accessed by all network users. The re wall may prevent the network
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from being accessed without being authorized, however, this component fails to check
potentially harmful contents such as computer worms and virus being disseminated over
the network. In order to screen these malicious codes, an intrusion prevention system
(IPS) (see Mirkovic et al, 2004) is designed to detect and prevent such malware from
invading the network. Additionally, IPS also monitors for suspicious network trac for
contents, volume and anomalies so as to protect the network from being attacked by
denial of service. On the other hand, to keep privacy, communication between two host
nodes in the network is encrypted as well. Meanwhile, all individual events occurred in the
network are tracked and audited for a later high level analysis. Besides, as surveillance and
early-warning tools, Honeypots (see Grimes, R. A., 2005) essentially decoying network-
accessible resources is also deployed in a network. Techniques employed by attackers
attempting to compromise any decoy resources are studied during and after an attack to
keep an eye on those new exploitation techniques. Such analysis could be used to further
tighten security of the actual network being protected by the honey pot.
For a comprehensive summary of standard concepts and methods in network security,
please refer to Curtin (1997) and Simmonds et al (2004), which presents all notions and
techniques in the form of an extensible ontology of network security attacks.
In Chapter 3, the network is abstracted as a vulnerable graph, which is composed
of nodes (users) and edges (connections). In order to model the infrastructure of the
network, a node of the graph is always assumed to have a random degree representing its
neighbors. Since our aim is to investigate how the random degree has an impact on the
network security, an attack outside the network is supposed to attempt to compromise
nodes all the time and any compromised nodes become his accomplices in the sense
of having the capability of compromising their neighbors. On the other hand, due to
these security components deployed over the network, the attacker only penetrates the
protection system with a certain probability, and the compromised nodes may be detected
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after being compromised and hence become secure after being disinfected. Likewise, to
make our model more multifunctional, it is also assumed that a node is compromised only
when at lease some prexed number of neighbors are infected. This model is an substantial
extension of that studied by Li et al (2011). In eect, we proved that the probability for a
node to be compromised is increasing as the random degree grows in the increasing convex
order. Among others, new lower and upper bounds are also built for the probability to
be compromised, evaluations reveals that they are better than those developed in Li et
al (2011). The main result shows that power law graph is more vulnerable than both the
random graph and the regular graph.
Figure 1.4: A depiction of a vulnerable network with security components
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1.2 Preliminaries
For ease of references, let us recall some fundamental yet important concepts on aging
property and stochastic ordering, which will be employed to characterize network systems
in the following chapters.
Throughout this dissertation, the term increasing is used instead of monotone non-
decreasing and the term decreasing is used instead of monotone non-increasing. We also
assume that all random variables under consideration have 0 as the common left end
point of their supports, and all random variables are implicitly assumed to be absolutely
continuous.
1.2.1 Important notations
1.2.2 Several aging properties
For a nonnegative random variable X with distribution function F and the reliability
function F = 1  F , let
Xt = X   tjX > t
be the residual lifetime of X at time t  0, the mean residual lifetime
F (t) = E[X   tjX > t] =
Z 1
t
F (x) dx
F (t)
:
Denition 1.2.1 A random lifetime X is said to be of
(i) increasing failure rate (IFR) if the cumulative failure rate   ln F (t) is convex with
respect to t  0;
(ii) increasing failure rate in average (IFRA) if the cumulative failure rate   ln F (t) is
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star-shaped with respect to t  0, that is,  1
t
log F (t) is increasing in t  0;
(iii) decreasing mean residual life (DMRL) if F (s)  F (t) for all t  s  0;
(iv) new better than used in expectation (NBUE) if F (t)  F (0) for all t  0.
Reversing the monotone property and the inequality above, we get their dual versions:
DFR (decreasing failure rate), DFRA (decreasing failure rate in average), IMRL (increas-
ing mean residual life) and NWUE (new better than used in expectation). The following
chain of implications is well-known,
IFR (DFR) =) IFRA (DFRA) =) DMRL (IMRL) =) NBUE (NWUE):
For more details on these nonparametric aging properties, please refer Barlow and
Proschan (1981), Lai and Xie (2006).
1.2.3 Some stochastic orders
For two nonnegative random variable X and Y with distribution functions F and G, and
reliability function F = 1   F and G = 1   G, denote F 1 and G 1 the corresponding
right continuous inverses of F and G respectively.
Denition 1.2.2 X is said to be smaller than Y in the
(i) hazard rate order (denoted by X hr Y ) if F (t)= G(t) is decreasing in t  0;
(ii) stochastic order (denoted as X st Y ) if Pr(X > t)  Pr(Y > t) for all t;
(iii) increasing convex order (denoted as X icx Y ) if
Z 1
t
Pr(X > x) dx 
Z 1
t
Pr(Y > x) dx; for all t;
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(iv) harmonic mean residual life order (denoted by X hmrl Y ) if, for all t  0,

1
t
Z t
0
1
F (u)
du
 1


1
t
Z t
0
1
G(u)
du
 1
;
for which the expectations exist.
(v) convex order (denoted by X cx Y ) if E[(X)]  E[(Y )] for any convex .
It holds evidently that
X hr Y =) X st Y =) X icx Y =) X cx Y:
Kochar and Wiens (1987) proposed a partial order to compare the NBUE-ness of two
life distributions. Since NBUE and NWUE are dual with each other, for convenience, we
call it the NWUE order.
Denition 1.2.3 X is said to be more NWUE than Y (denoted by X nwue Y ) if
F
 
F 1(v)

G
 
G 1(v)
  F
G
; for all v 2 (0; 1): (1.1)
As a function of v 2 (0; 1), Z F 1(v)
0
F (t) dt
is the well-known total time on test (TTT) transform of the distribution F of a random
lifetime X. The scaled TTT transform
' 1F (v) =
1
F
Z F 1(v)
0
F (t) dt
plays an important role in characterizing aging property of random lifetime. One may see
Kochar et al. (2002), Li and Shaked (2007) for more on TTT transform.
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Recently, Kochar et al. (2002) proposed a new partial order: X is said to be larger
than Y in the total time on test transform order (denoted by X ttt Y ) if
Z F 1(v)
0
F (x) dx 
Z G 1(v)
0
G(x) dx; for all v 2 (0; 1):
These two stochastic orders mentioned above have a close relation in the sense that when
E[X] = E[Y ], X nwue Y is equivalent to X ttt Y .
Readers may refer to Muller and Stoyan (2002), Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007),
and Li and Li (2013) for more details on these stochastic orders.
1.2.4 The k-out-of-n structure
Let X1; X2;    ; Xn denote n independent component lifetimes with Xi;n being the i-th
order statistic, here i = 1;    ; n. A k-out-of-n system of these components functions if
and only if at least k components function. When k = n, the system has a series structure
with lifetime
Xn;n = minfX1;    ; Xng;
whereas for k = 1, it reduces to a parallel structure with lifetime
X1;n = maxfX1;    ; Xng:
Thus, a k-out-of-n system is more general than either a series or a parallel structure. The
lifetime of this system is simply given by the order statistic Xn k+1:n.
As a fault-tolerant structure, the k-out-of-n system is widely used in many practi-
cal situations, including, for example, electronic engineering, manufacturing and defense
industry etc. One may refer to Kuo and Zuo (2006) and Lai and Xie (2006) for compre-
hensive discussions on k-out-of-n structure. In this thesis, we will employ this structure
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to describe a network which is tolerant to some compromised neighbors due to anti-virus
software.
1.3 Archimedean copula
Mutual independence among multiple random variables is common in reliability and risk
management. The interdependence among components' lifetimes, random risks, and po-
tential loss/returns etc. cannot be ignored in practical situations. In classical statistical
theory, Pearson's correlation coecient is usually utilized to measure the dependence
among random variables. In Chapter 2 we will instead employ copula, a functional mea-
sure, to characterize the association among network users' lifetimes.
For a random vector X = (X1; : : : ; Xn) with joint distribution function F , survival
function F and univariate marginal distribution functions F1; : : : ; Fn, its copula is dened
as
CX(u1;    ; un) = F
 
F 11 (u1);    ; F 1n (un)

; 0 < u1;    ; un < 1:
In parallel, the survival copula is
bCX(u1;    ; un) = F  F 11 (u1);    ; F 1n (un); 0 < u1;    ; un < 1:
Since the copula does not contain any information of marginal distributions, it provides
us with a rather convenient way to impose a dependence structure onto predetermined
marginal distributions in practice. Actually a large number of excellent applications
of copulas can be found in various areas, and so far copula has become more or less
a standard tool in risk management, nance, econometrics and actuarial science etc.
Recently, Copulas are being used for reliability analysis of complex systems of machine
components with competing failure modes in reliability engineering, see for example Pham
12
and Hong (2003), and copula functions have been successfully applied to the database
formulation for the reliability analysis of highway bridges, and to various multivariate
simulation studies in civil, mechanical and oshore engineering, see for example Thompson
and Kilgore(2011). In literature on statistics, there are a large number of copulas depicting
various dependence structures, Hutchinson and Lai (1990) and Nelsen (2006) provide a
wide range families of bivariate copulas along with their properties. In the past twenty
years, Archimedean copulas became particularly popular because of its mathematical
tractability and the capability of capturing wide ranges of dependence. Notably, since
the statistical inference on Archimedean copulas has got well developed in this decade,
excellent applications are coming to the fore in various areas.
Denition 1.3.1 (McNeil and Neslehova (2009)) For a non-increasing and contin-
uous function  : [0;+1) 7! [0; 1] such that (0) = 1 and (+1) = 0, let  =  1 be
the pseudo-inverse,
C(u1;    ; un) = 
 
 (u1) +   +  (un)

; for (u1;    ; un) 2 [0; 1]n, (1.2)
is called an Archimedean copula with the generator  if ( 1)k(k)(x)  0 for k = 0; : : : ; n 
2 and ( 1)n 2(n 2)(x) is non-increasing and convex.
The generator  is said to be strict if (+1) = 0. As is well-known, the Archimedean
family contains a plenty of useful copulas, including some well-known ones. For example,
the independence (product) copula C1(u) =
Qn
i=1 ui with the generator (t) = e
 t, the
Clayton copula
C2(u) =
 nY
i=1
u i   n+ 1
 1=
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with the generator (t) = (t+ 1) 1= for   0, and the Ali-Mikhail-Haq (AMH) copula
C3(u) =
(1  )
nY
i=1
ui
nY
i=1
(1   + ui)  
nY
i=1
ui
:
with the generator (t) = 1 
et  for  2 [0; 1). For more on copula and its applications, we
refer readers to Joe (1997) and Nelsen (2006).
1.4 Summary
Resilience analysis of P2P network
By studying the isolation probability and the durable time of a single user, we conduct
resilience and reliability analysis of the P2P network, which is widely used in commu-
nication systems in recent several years due to the decentralized property. It is proved
that the network with the user's lifetime having more NWUE-ness is more resilient. Both
graphical and nonparametric statistical methods are developed to test the NWUE order
between two real data sets.
Security analysis of networks
A stochastic model is introduced to investigate security of network systems based on
their vulnerability graph abstractions. Instead of doing traditional security analysis, we
employ the increasing convex ordering to study the underlying vulnerability graph, the
main theoretical results carry an insight on designing a more secure system and enhancing
the security of an existing system.
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2Resilience Analysis of P2P Network
Systems
2.1 Introduction
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) internet network allows a group of computer users equipped with the
same networking program to connect with each other for the purpose of directly accessing
les from one another's hard drives. A P2P network functions by connecting individual
computers together to share les instead of going through a central server. P2P networks
can be classied by what they can be used for, for instance, content delivery, le sharing,
telephony, media streaming (audio, video) and discussion forums etc. In the current study
of P2P networks, Kaashoek and Karger (2003) and Stoica et al. (2001) investigate the
single-node isolation, Aspnes et al. (2002), Ganesh and Massoulie (2003), Gummadi et al.
(2003), and Massoulie (2003) etc discuss the disconnection of the entire graph. Bhagwan
et al. (2003) is among the rst to pay attention to the more realistic P2P failure models, in
which the intrinsic behavior of internet users is taken into account and the departments
of users depend on more complex factors including their attention span and browsing
habits, and so on, other than the traditional simple binary metric. In order to investigate
the properties of such systems, Leonard et al. (2005) recently introduces the node-failure
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model based on users' lifetimes and studies the stochastic resilience of P2P networks, in
which an user stays online for random periods of time till all his neighbors go o line or
he leaves the network on his own initiative. In this model, the random lifetime that an
arriving user will stay on line reects both the behavior of the user itself and the duration
of its service to the entire P2P network community.
This chapter proposes a more general P2P network model, in which an user is isolated
only when a number of its neighbors leave the network and hence the P2P model in
Leonard et al. (2005) is included as a special case. We further investigate both the
stochastic resilience and reliability properties of this new model. It is proved that the
network with the user's lifetime having more NWUE-ness is more resilient. The rest
of this paper is organized as below: Section 2 introduces the new P2P network model.
Section 3 studies the stochastic resilience by using the isolation probability of a single
user, and Section 4 discusses some reliability properties of the available time of a single
user in the network. Finally, both graphical and nonparametric methods are developed
in section 5 to detect the NWUE order between two data sets. All main conclusions are
consistent with those obtained through experiments in the literature.
2.2 Model description
In this section, we describe our P2P network model in details and present its rationality.
For an internet user, let X, a nonnegative random variable, be the lifetime that stays
online in the network for his own purpose or providing services to other peers. Saroiu et al.
(2002), Bustemante and Qiao (2003) pointed out that the distribution of an user's lifetime
in practical P2P network very well accords with Pareto distribution, which possesses of
the well-known new worse than used in expectation (NWUE) property (they called it the
heavy-tail property). It is worthwhile mentioning that Harchol-Balter and Downey (1997)
16
found that the distribution of the lifetime of an UNIX process is also Pareto, it was named
there as used better than new in expectation (UBNE) instead of NWUE. Here, we assume
a general type of the distribution of the user's lifetime other than Pareto law so that the
new model not only is suitable for human-based P2P networks but also can be applied to
non-human network systems.
For a new internet user with random lifetime X having the distribution function F ,
assume
Figure 2.1: A typical depiction of a node with 3-out-of-6 structure
(i) the P2P network system has operated so long that there is no transient eect, that
is, the expected lifetime of the new user is negligible in contrast to the age of the
whole P2P system;
(ii) when entering the system, the new user randomly (in the sense that each existing
user has the same probability to be selected) picks k neighbors from the existing
nodes in the system as soon as it enters into the system;
(iii) the selection of neighbors is independent of both the lifetime X and the neighbors'
present ages;
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(iv) the time that a new user will spend in the system is independent of those of his
neighbors.
Since the P2P network has operated for a suciently long period when the new user
joins the system, it is reasonable to suppose that all those selected neighbors have ~X, the
equilibrium renewal excess lifetime of X, as their common residual lifetime, that is,
F ~X(t) =
1
F
Z t
0
F (x) dx;
where F = E[X] and t  0.
For 1  r  k, denote ~Xr the residual lifetime of the r-th neighbor. According to
David and Nagaraja (2003), the order statistic ~Xr;k, which gives the residual lifetime of
the r-th failed neighbor, has the reliability function
F ~Xr;k(t) =
r 1X
i=0

k
i

[F ~X(t)]
i  F ~X(t)k i = rkr
Z 1
F ~X(t)
ur 1(1  u)k r du
and the probability density function
f ~Xr;k(t) =
r


k
r

F (t) [F ~X(t)]
r 1  F ~X(t)k r :
In the study of passive model in Leonard et al. (2005), a node is considered as isolated
after its last surviving neighbor fails. However, in many realistic environments, neighbors
of a node usually fail to service due to lower performance and in fact it reaches the isolation
state only if there are1  r  k neighbors in failure. An instantiation of such a case is
that this node is sharing an animation le with its neighbors. Under the condition that
a fraction of its neighbors (not necessary all its neighbors) fail to service, the display of
the animation le is so incoherent that this node can be considered as disconnected. As
a result, we adopt the more general P2P model that a node is considered to be isolated
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or disconnected only when more than r   1 neighbors fail to service. This is in fact the
famous r-out-of-k structure and thus the passive model in Leonard et al. (2005) is the
special case with r = k.
We will investigate the stochastic resilience of this P2P model by using the isolation
probability
r(X) = Pr
 
X > ~Xr;k

; (2.1)
which denotes the probability that the new node outlives the residual lifetime of its r-th
neighbor before it decides to leave the system. It is obvious that larger isolation probability
means worse resilience of the P2P network. On the other hand, we will employ
Tr(X) = min

X; ~Xr;k
	
(2.2)
rather than ~Xr;k to measure the durable time of a new node in a P2P network. It should
be marked here that Leonard et al. (2005) studies P2P networks by using ~Xk;k, the time
that all k neighbors of the new node are simultaneously in failure state before it decides
to leave the system. However, as a competition between the lifetime X and the lifetime
~Xr;k, Tr(X) takes into account both the failure due to neighbors and that due to the new
user itself, it is more reasonable to serve as a metric to measure the stochastic resilience
of P2P networks.
2.3 Resilience analysis
Resilience analysis of random graphs and various types of deterministic networks has
attracted considerable interest of researchers during the past several decades. For more
details, please refer to Bollobas (2001), Burtin (1977), and Leighton et al. (1995). Along
this line of study, one of the most important problems is that under what failure conditions
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the network appears disconnection or demonstrates noticeably lower performance to its
users. Assuming uniformly random node failure, Stoica et al. (2001), Bollobas (2001),
Gummadi et al. (2003) derive the conditions from dierent points of view under which
the networks stay connected after some nodes fail.
In this section, we study the resilience of P2P network systems by evaluating the
isolation probability for any given user. As described in Section 2, a node with lifetime X
is forced to disconnect from the system only if X is greater than ~Xr;k, 1  r  k. Then,
the isolation probability is
r(X) = Pr
 
~Xr;k < X

=
Z 1
0
Pr(X > t)f ~Xr;k(x) dt
=
r
k

k
r
Z 1
0
F 2(t)
Z t
0
F (u) du
r 1Z 1
t
F (u) du
k r
dt: (2.3)
As illustrations, isolation probabilities corresponding to the three popular lifetime
distributions are evaluated in the following examples.
Example 2.3.1 (Pareto distribution) Suppose the user has a lifetime X with proba-
bility distribution
G(x) = 1 

1 +
t

 
; t > 0;  > 1;  > 0:
Then, for any 1  r  k, the isolation probability
r(X) = r

k
r

 1

kZ 1
0

1+
t

 2"Z t
0

1+
u

 
du
#r 1 "Z 1
t

1+
u

 
du
#k r
dt
=

k
r

r(  1)

Z 1
0

1 +
t

 2 "
1 

1 +
t

1 #r 1
1 +
t

(1 )(k r)
dt
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=
k
r

r(  1)

Z 1
0
"
1 

1 +
t

1 #r 1
1 +
t

(1 )(k r) 2
dt
= r

k
r
Z 1
0
t k r+

 1 (1  t)r 1 dt (2.4)
=
k!
(k   r)!
 
 
k   r + 1 + 
 1

 
 
k + 1 + 
 1
 ; for any 1  r  k.
Example 2.3.2 (Exponential distribution) Suppose the user has a lifetime Y with
distribution
F (x) = 1  e t; t  0:
According to (2.3), any new node has the isolation probability
r(Y ) = r

k
r

k
Z 1
0
e 2t
r 1
 
1  e tr 1 1
k r
 
e t
k r
dt
= r

k
r


Z 1
0
 
e t
k r+2  
1  e tr 1 dt
= r

k
r
Z 1
0
tk r+1(1  t)r 1 dt (2.5)
=
k!
(r   1)!(k   r)!
(r   1)!(k   r + 1)!
(k + 1)!
=
k   r + 1
k + 1
; for any 1  r  k.
Example 2.3.3 (Uniform distribution) Suppose the user Z has a lifetime with uni-
form distribution on the interval (0; 2), that is, the distribution function
H(x) =
t
2
; 0  t  2;  > 0:
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Then, the isolation probability is
r(Z) =

k
r

r
k
Z 2
0

1  t
2
2 Z t
0

1  u
2

du
r 1

Z 2
t

1  u
2

du
k r
dt
=
r


k
r
Z 2
0

2  t
2
2 "
1 

2  t
2
2#r 1
2  x
2
2(k r)
dt
= r

k
r
Z 1
0
tk r+
1
2 (1  t)r 1 dt (2.6)
=
k!
(k   r)!
 
 
k   r + 3
2

 
 
k + 3
2
 ; for any 1  r  k.
From (2.4), (2.5) and (2.6), we observe the following:
(i) All of the three probabilities of isolation are independent of the expectation of
the user's lifetime. So, it seems that property of the distribution instead of the
expectation has direct impact on the isolation probability.
(ii) The isolation probability corresponding to Pareto lifetime is the smallest one, the
uniform distribution achieves the largest isolation probability. Thus, we may con-
clude that the P2P network that users has Pareto lifetime is the most resilient one.
Based upon the above two facts, one may wonder whether the isolation probability
preserves some stochastic order on user's lifetime, that is, r(X) < r(Y ) holds for X
smaller than Y in some stochastic sense. As a positive answer, Theorem 2.3.4 below
asserts that a P2P network with users' lifetime having a stronger NWUE property is
more resilient.
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Theorem 2.3.4 Suppose that X and Y are two nonnegative random variables which
represent user lifetimes of two dierent P2P systems, respectively. Then, X nwue Y
implies r(X)  r(Y ).
Proof: For any 1  r  k, the isolation probability r(X) can be rephrased as
r(X) = Pr( ~Xr;k < X)
=
Z 1
0
F ~Xr;k(x) dF (x)
= r

k
r
Z 1
0
Z F ~X(x)
0
ur 1(1  u)k r du dF (x)
= r

k
r
Z ' 1F (v)
0
ur 1(1  u)k r du dF (x)
= r

k
r
Z 1
0
Z ' 1F (v)
0
ur 1(1  u)k r du dv;
here the scaled TTT transform
' 1F (v) =
1
F
Z F 1(v)
0
F (t) dt:
Likewise, the isolation probability
r(Y ) = r

k
r
Z 1
0
Z ' 1G (v)
0
ur 1(1  u)k r du dv:
Note that X nwue Y if and only if, for all v 2 (0; 1),
1
F
Z F 1(v)
0
F (u) du  1
G
Z G 1(v)
0
G(u) du;
the desired result follows immediately.
For the three distributions in Examples 2.3.2, 2.3.1 and 2.3.3, it is easy to verify that
G(t)  G, F (t) = (1 + t=)F  F and H(t) = H   t=2  H for all t  0.
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As a result, it holds that X nwue Y nwue Z. According to Theorem 2.3.4, we have
r(X)  r(Y )  r(Z), which can also be veried directly in Examples 2.3.1, 2.3.2 and
2.3.3.
2.4 Reliability analysis
The mean durable time of a user entering into a P2P network system is derived as below.
Proposition 2.4.1 For a P2P network system with user's lifetime X,
E[Tr(X)] =
r F
k + 1
; for all r = 1;    ; k.
Proof: Since Tr(X) is nonnegative, it holds that
E[Tr(X)] =
Z 1
0
Pr
 
min

X; ~Xr;k
	
> x

dx
=
Z 1
0
F (x) F ~Xr;k(x) dx
= r

k
r
Z 1
0
F (x)
"Z 1
F ~X(x)
ur 1(1  u)k r du
#
dx
= r

k
r
Z 1
0
ur 1(1  u)k r
"Z F 1~X (u)
0
F (x) dx
#
du
= r

k
r
Z 1
0
ur 1(1  u)k r
"Z F 1~X (u)
0
dF ~X(x)
#
du
= r

k
r
Z 1
0
ur(1  u)k r du
=
r F
k + 1
; for any 1  r  k.
The above proposition reveals that the durable time of a new user in P2P network
is distribution free. More precisely, for a P2P network with any type of user's lifetime
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distribution, the expected time it stays online depends upon the user's lifetime distribution
only through its expectation.
2.4.1 Preservation of aging properties
The next result asserts that the durable time of the user in P2P system preserves both
IFR and IFRA properties of the user's lifetime distribution.
Theorem 2.4.2 If X is IFR (IFRA), then Tr(X) is also IFR (IFRA).
Proof: IFR implies DMRL. It is known that the DMRL property of X is equivalent to
the IFR property of ~X. Since IFR property is preserved by the k-out-of-n structure with
i.i.d units, it follows that ~Xr;k is IFR. On the other hand, IFR property is also preserved
by series system with independent components. So, we obtain the preservation of IFR.
Since IFRA property is preserved for coherent structure (see Barlow and Proschan
(1981)), the rest proof is the same as before.
As an application of Theorem 2.4.2, we build a lower bound of reliability of the durable
time of the user in P2P network.
Corollary 2.4.3 Let X be a nonnegative random variable which represents the user's
lifetime of P2P network system. If X is IFRA with mean , then, for all 1  r  k,
FTr(X)(x) 

1  (k + 1)t
r

+
; for all t  0,
where x+ = maxfx; 0g.
Proof: Theorem 2.4.2 guarantees that Tr(X) is IFRA and hence NBUE. By Hu et al
(2001), it holds that X is NBUE if and only if ~X st X, which implies
FTr(X)(x) 
1
E[Tr(X)]
Z t
0
FTr(X)(u) du 
(k + 1)t
r
;
25
for all 1  r  k and t  0. This completes the proof.
2.4.2 Stochastic monotonicity
Hu et al. (2001) characterized some stochastic orders in terms of other stochastic orders
between their corresponding equilibrium versions. Especially, it is proved that X hr (st
)Y if and only if ~X hr (st) ~Y . Based on this and the fact that both the order hr and
the order st are closed for k-out-of-n structure with independent units (see Shaked and
Shanthikumar (2007)), it is easy to obtain the proposition below, which asserts that the
durable time of the user in P2P network preserves both the hazard rate order and the
stochastic order of the parent distribution.
Proposition 2.4.4 If X hr (st)Y , then Tr(X) hr (st)Tr(Y ).
At the beginning of this section, we have concluded that the durable time of the
user in P2P network is distribution free. In other words, we cannot distinguish the
dierence between P2P network systems with dierent types of user lifetime distributions
by contrasting the mean durable times of users. In this subsection, we will present a
convex order result on Tr. Precisely, the durable times of the user of two dierent P2P
network systems are ordered in the sense of the convex order if their respective parent
distributions are of common mean and ordered in the sense of the harmonic mean residual
life order. Let us rst recall a useful lemma due to Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007).
Lemma 2.4.5 Suppose E[X] = E[Y ]. Then, X cx Y if and only if
Z 1
x
F (u) du 
Z 1
x
G(u) du; for all x:
Now, we get ready to present our main result in this subsection.
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Theorem 2.4.6 Suppose E[X] = E[Y ]. If X hmrl Y , then Tr(X) cx Tr(Y ).
Proof: For all 1  r  k and t  0, it holds that
Z 1
t
FTr(X)(x) dx =
Z 1
t
F (x) F ~Xr;k(x) dx
= r

k
r
Z 1
t
"Z 1
F ~X(x)
ur 1(1  u)k r du
#
dF ~X(x)
= r

k
r
Z 1
F ~X(t)
Z 1
v
ur 1(1  u)k r du

dv:
Similarly, we have, for all 1  r  k and t  0,
Z 1
t
FTr(Y )(x) dx = r

k
r
Z 1
F ~Y (t)
Z 1
v
ur 1(1  u)k r du

dv:
In view of the equivalence betweenX hmrl Y and ~X st ~Y , it follows from the assumption
of X hmrl Y that F ~X(x)  F ~Y (x) for all x  0 and hence
Z 1
t
FTr(X)(x) dx 
Z 1
t
FTr(Y )(x) dx; for all t  0:
On the other hand, E[X] = E[Y ] =  implies E[Tr(X)] = E[Tr(Y )] =
r
k + 1
. Thus, the
desired result Tr(X) cx Tr(Y ) can be validated by Lemma 2.4.5 again.
Let X, Y and Z be Pareto, exponential and uniform random variables with a common
expectation . It is easy to verify that X hmrl Y hmrl Z. Thus, from Theorem 2.4.6 it
follows immediately that Tr(X) cx Tr(Y ) cx Tr(Z).
2.5 Interdependence among users lifetimes
In previous subsections we investigate the resilience and reliability of the P2P network
through some discussions on the isolation probability and the durable time. As is seen,
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the order statistics ~Xr;k plays the very important role in characterizing both isolation
probability (2.1) and the durable time (2.2). Note that the discussion over there is de-
veloped under the framework of mutual independence among users' lifetimes. Here we
introduce the statistical dependence by equipping the users' lifetimes with the well-known
Archimedean copula and then explore the eect due to statistical dependence among users'
lifetimes.
Assume (X1;    ; Xk) and (Y1;    ; Yk) have their Archimedean copulas C1 and C2 ,
respectively. Let E[Xi] = E[Yi], i = 1;    ; k. Denote Wi the random variable such that
i(t) = E

e tWi

; for t  0 and i = 1; 2.
We next present the following theorem to throw a light into our P2P network systems.
Theorem 2.5.1 Suppose W1 st W2 and  1( F ~X(t))   2( F ~Y (t)) for all t  0. Then,
Tr(X) st Tr(Y ).
Proof: Note that W1 st W2 and  1( F ~X(t))   2( F ~Y (t)) for all t  0. From Theorem
3.9 of Rezapour and Alamatsaz (2014) it follows immediately that
~Xr;k st ~Yr;k; for r = 1;    ; k. (2.7)
Additionally, W1 st W2 implies 1(t)  2(t) for all t  0 or equivalently,
 1   2(u)  u; for all u 2 (0; 1).
Also,  1
 
F ~X(t)
   2  F ~Y (t) for all t  0 implies that
 1   2(u)  F ~X  F 1~Y (u); for all u 2 (0; 1).
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As a consequence, we have F ~X  F 1~Y (u)  u for all u 2 (0; 1). Equivalently, F ~X(t)  F ~Y (t)
for all t  0. Take E[X] = E[Y ] into account we have FX(t)  FY (t) for all t  0. That
is, X st Y . Now, in combination with (2.7) we get
Tr(X) = min

X; ~Xr;k
	 st minY; ~Yr;k	 = Tr(Y ):
That is the desired result.
In accordance with Theorem 2.5.1, reliability engineers may improve the reliability of
the P2P network system through (i) strengthen the interdependence among users' life-
times and (ii) choosing much more dispersed lifetime distribution for users. Note that
the generator  determines the degree of corresponding dependence, one may naturally
wonder whether we can improve the resilience of the network by imposing stronger inter-
dependence among its users. The following example serves as a negative answer.
Example 2.5.2 Consider two 3-dimensional random vectors (U1; U2; U3) and (V1; V2; V3)
both with uniform marginals on [0; 1]. Assume that they have Clayton copulas with
generators
1(t) = (2t+ 1)
 1=2 and 2(t) = (t+ 1) 1;
respectively. Note that  1  2(0) = 0 and  1  2 = ((1 + t)2   1)=2 is convex and hence
super-additive. However, as is shown in Figure 2.2, Pr
 
U2:3  t
   Pr V2:3  t is rst
positive then negative on the interval [0; 1], indicating that there is no stochastic order
between U2:3 and V2:3.
2.6 Identifying the NWUE order
As is seen in previous section, NWUE property of a random lifetime plays an important
role in determining both reliability and resilience of a P2P network. In this section, we
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Figure 2.2: Pr
 
U2:3  t
  Pr V2:3  t.
build some methods to detect the strict NWUE order based upon two samples
Xn = (X1; : : : ; Xn); Ym = (Y1; : : : ; Ym)
from independent populations X and Y with continuous distributions, respectively.
2.6.1 Graphical method based on TTT plot
Dene
' 1F (v) =
1
F
Z F 1(v)
0
F (t) dt; v 2 (0; 1);
the scaled total time on test (TTT) transform (see Barlow and Campo (1975)) of the
distribution F of a random lifetime X. Since F and ' 1F uniquely determine each other,
TTT transform is convenient to be used to judge the aging properties of X. Bergman
(1979) showed that X is NWUE if and only if ' 1F (v)  v for all v 2 (0; 1).
Example 2.6.1 (Pareto distribution) For the distribution in Example 2.3.1, it holds
that Z G 1(v)
0
G(t) dt =

  1

1  (1  v)1 1=v ; v 2 (0; 1):
Thus, the scaled TTT transform
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Figure 2.3: Scaled TTT plots of Pareto distributions with  = 100; 5; 2; 1:25
' 1G (v) = 1  (1  v)1 1=v; v 2 (0; 1):
It is evident that shape parameter  has a direct impact on the degree of NWUE
property whilst the scaled TTT transform is independent of the scale parameter . As
can be seen in Figure 2.6.1, the smaller the shape parameter , the more far below the
diagonal the scaled TTT transform, and hence the more NWUE the distribution is.
Let Fn(t) be the empirical distribution function, X1:n      Xn:n be order statistics
and X = 1
n
Pn
i=1Xi be the sample mean of X1;    ; Xn. Then, for i = 1;    ; n,
' 1Fn

i
n

=
1
X
Z F 1n (i=n)
0
Fn(t) dt =
iX
j=1
Xj:n + (n  i)Xi:n
nX
j=1
Xj:n
;
gives the sample version of the scaled TTT transform, which converges to the population
version ' 1F (v) as sample size n!1. As a result, the data set has the NWUE property
31
if its scaled TTT plot

i
n
; ' 1Fn

i
n

; i = 1;    ; n;
lies below the diagonal line.
Example 2.6.2 (Proschan, 1963) Lifetimes (in hours) of the air-conditioning systems
in two dierent planes are recorded in Table 2.6.2 below. TTT plots based upon these
plane's type sample
8045 14,14,27,32,34,54,57,59,61,66,67,102,134,152,209,230
7909 10,14,20,23,24,25,26,29,44,44,49,56,59,60,61,62,
70,76,79,84,90,101,118,130,156,186,208,208,310
Table 2.1: Life times of air-conditioning systems of planes
lifetimes are listed in Figure 2.4. Apparently, they both are not below the diagonal line
Figure 2.4: TTT plots of air-conditioning systems in airplane: 8045 (), 7909 ()
and hence lifetimes of these two systems don't possess the NWUE property.
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As a matter of fact, it is also quite convenient to identify the NWUE order by com-
paring the two TTT plots. It may be derived from (1.1) directly that
X nwue Y if and only if ' 1F (v)  ' 1G (v) for all v 2 (0; 1):
Therefore, it is reasonable to identify the NWUE order through checking whether

i
n
; ' 1Fn

i
n

; i = 1;    ; n;
the TTT plot based on X1;    ; Xn, lies below

j
m
; ' 1Gm

j
m

; j = 1;    ;m;
the TTT plot based on Y1;    ; Ym, here, for j = 1;    ;m,
' 1Gm

j
m

=
1
Y
Z G 1m (j=m)
0
Gm(t) dt =
jX
k=1
Yk:m + (m  j)Yj:m
mX
k=1
Yk:m
;
Y1:m      Ym:m are order statistics and Y is the sample mean corresponding to
Y1;    ; Ym.
Example 2.6.3 (Skype and Yahoo) The users' times (in seconds) of the network chat-
ting systems are recorded in both Skype and Yahoo network chatting systems in Table
2.6.3.
As can be seen in Figure 2.5, the two TTT plots lie far below the diagonal demon-
strating the obvious NWUE property. Further, TTT plot of Skype system is below that
of Yahoo system and hence showing a stronger NWUE property.
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System sample
Yahoo 6,9,13,18,24,28,38,44,48,54,57,69,86,120,150,176,
198,206,234,306,400,447,502,604,708,800,1005,1560
Skype 2,5,8,11,12,15,19,22,26,30,34,36,39,40,41,52,55,57,
56,70,83,108,117,209,306,409,530,602,845,1203,1882
Table 2.2: Times user spend in chatting systems
Figure 2.5: TTT plots of network chatting systems: Yahoo (), Skype ()
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2.6.2 A nonparametric test
In literature, some partial orders were introduced to measure various common aging prop-
erties, such as IFR, IFRA, NBU, DMRL and NBUE. However, they can not be accurately
detected without the parametric forms of survival functions. As a result, engineers resort
to statistical methods in practical applications. In the past decades, nonparametric pro-
cedures were proposed to test the IFR order, IFRA order, NBU order and DMRL order,
respectively. One may refer Aly (1993), Ahamed and Kochar (1990), Kusum et al (1986),
Hollander et al (1982) and Gerlach (1986), and Lai and Xie (2006) for more details. Here,
we propose a nonparametric test for the strict NWUE order.
According to Kochar and Wiens (1987), X nwue Y and X nwue Y (written as
X  Y ) if and only if F (t) = G(t) for all t  0, where  = G=F , G = E[Y ] and
F = E[X]. That is, two random lives have same degree of NWUE-ness if and only if
their survival functions dier by at most a positive scale factor. In order to test the
following hypothesis
H: X  Y versus K: X nwue Y strictly,
it is necessary to build some testing statistic and derive its (asymptotic) null distribution.
Let
(Y ) =
Z 1
0
G2(t) dt; (X) =
Z 1
0
F 2(t) dt:
The following lemma helps to build a testing statistic for H versus K.
Proposition 2.6.4 If X nwue Y , then
(X; Y ) =
(X)
F
  (Y )
G
 0; (2.8)
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the strict inequality holds when X is strictly more NBUE than Y , that is, X nwue Y but
not X  Y .
Proof: X nwue Y implies F (F 1(s))   1G(G 1(s)) for all 0  s  1. Then,
Z 1
0
Z 1
F 1(s)
F (y) dy ds =
Z 1
0
F (F
 1(s)) ds
 1

Z 1
0
G(G
 1(s)) ds
=
1

Z 1
0
Z 1
G 1(s)
G(y) dy ds: (2.9)
By Fubini's theorem,
Z 1
0
Z 1
F 1(s)
F (y) dy ds =
Z 1
0
Z F (y)
0
F (y) ds dy
=
Z 1
0
F (y)F (y) dy
= E[X] 
Z 1
0
F 2(y) dy;
Likewise, Z 1
0
Z 1
G 1(s)
G(y) dy ds = E[Y ] 
Z 1
0
G2(y) dy:
So, (2.9) implies
Z 1
0
F 2(y) dy   1

Z 1
0
G2(y) dy  E[X]  1

E[Y ] = 0;
irrespective of the two means F and G.
According to Proposition 2.6.4, (X; Y ) = 0 when X  Y , and (X; Y ) > 0 when
X nwue Y strictly. So, it serves as a reasonable measure for the deviation from the null
hypothesis H toward the alternative K.
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Let
(Xn) =

n
2
 1 nX
i 6=j
minfXi; Xjg; (Ym) =

m
2
 1 mX
i6=j
minfYi; Yjg:
According to the theory of U-statistic (Hoeding, 1948), if E[X4] <1, then, as n!1,
p
n
 
(Xn)  (X)

2X
L ! N (0; 1);
where
2X = E[E[minfX1; X2gjX1]  (X)]2:
By Slutsky's theorem, it holds that, as n!1,
p
n

(Xn)
X
  (X)
F

2
X
F
L ! N (0; 1): (2.10)
Likewise, as m!1,
p
m

(Ym)
Y
  (Y )
G

2
Y
G
L ! N (0; 1); (2.11)
where
Y =
1
m
mX
i=1
Yi; 
2
Y = E[E[minfY1; Y2gjY1]  (Y )]2:
Combining (2.10) and (2.11), we reach the asymptotic distribution of
(Xn;Ym) =
(Xm)
X
  (Yn)Y :
Proposition 2.6.5 Suppose E[X4];E[Y 4] <1, and m
n+m
is bounded away from 0 and 1.
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Then, as min(n;m)!1,
r
nm
n+m
(Xn;Ym) (X; Y )p
2(X; Y )
L ! N (0; 1); (2.12)
where (X; Y ) is determined by (2.8) and
2(X;Y ) =
m
n+m
2X
E2[X]
+
n
n+m
2Y
E2[Y ]
:
The parameter 2(X;Y ) is unknown and hence needs to be consistently estimated.
Set
Vi(Xn) =
1
n  1
X
j 6=i
minfXi; Xjg; i = 1; 2;    ; n:
By Arvesen (1969), as n!1, the jackkning estimate
S2(Xn) =
1
n  1
nX
i=1
 
Vi(Xn)  (Xn)
2 P ! 2X :
Likewise, as m!1,
S2(Ym) =
1
m  1
mX
j=1
 
Vj(Ym)  (Ym)
2 P ! 2Y :
Now, applying Slutsky's theorem to (2.12), we immediately get the following.
Proposition 2.6.6 Under the assumptions in Proposition 2.6.5, as minfn;mg ! 1,
r
nm
n+m
(Xn;Ym) (X; Y )p
S2(Xn;Ym)
L ! N (0; 1); (2.13)
where
S2(Xn;Ym) =
m
n+m
S2(Xn)
X2
+
n
n+m
S2(Ym)
Y 2
:
Since (X; Y ) = 0 under the original H, from (2.13), now, we get the following testing
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rule with the asymptotic level 0 <  < 1: H may be reasonably rejected when
T (Xn;Ym) =
r
nm
n+m
(Xn;Ym)p
S2(Xn;Ym)
> z1 ;
where z1  is the 1   percentile of the standard normal distribution N (0; 1). Standard
arguments give rise to the consistency of the test.
To end this chapter, we apply the above testing method to data sets in Examples 2.6.2
and 2.6.3. Testing statistics observed as well as corresponding p-values are presented in
the following table.
data set sample size (n;m) T (Xn;Ym) p-value
air-conditioning systems (16,29) 0.022 0.5088
Skype/Yahoo chatting (28,31) 2.2048 0.0237
Table 2.3: Statistics on data sets of air-conditioning and network chatting systems
Apparently,
(i) for the data set on air-conditioning systems, the larger p-value 0:5088 suggests us
to accept the original hypothesis. That is, NWUE order between the lifetimes (in
hours) of the air-conditioning systems in two dierent planes is insignicant;
(ii) however by contrast, p-value corresponding to the network chatting is only 0:0237,
it is reasonable to reject the original hypothesis. That is, the lifetime of a user in
Skype chatting system is more NWUE than that of Yahoo.
2.6.3 Concluding remarks
(i) No NWUE order is detected in lifetimes of air-condition systems in airplanes. Ac-
tually, an air-condition system is composed of some mechanical components, which
will wear-out (at least during one maintenance cycle) as it is put into operation.
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Thus, the two lifetimes of the air-conditioning systems do not have the NWUE
property at all.
(ii) NWUE order is detected in chatting times (P2P network) of Yahoo and Skype.
As software, both systems will be improved through removing bugs and patching
program after being put into use. As a result, the chatting times of Yahoo and
Skype inherently possess the NWUE property. Our test detects the NWUE order
between the two chatting times.
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3Security Analysis of
Compromised-Neighbor-Tolerant Networks
3.1 Introduction
In traditional security analysis of a network system, it usually focuses on cryptographic
primitives and protocols, such as how a message is reasonably padded before being en-
crypted by the RSA (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman) function or how a password-based authen-
tication protocol is properly operated so that the network system is immune to the o-line
dictionary attack, etc. Although this approach of analysis works well, it would be more
ecient if the knowledge on, for instance, network topology (the specic physical or log-
ical arrangement of elements in a network) and defensive capability, etc, is acquired and
properly exploited, since they usually have a signicant impact on the security.
In the literature, a lot of epidemic models, for example, Kephart and White (1991),
Kephart et al (1993), Aron and Grove (1998), Wierman and Marchette (2004), Li et al
(2007), and Piqueira et al (2008), among others, were adopted in succession to study the
spreading of computer viruses or worms and to address various aspects on the security of
network systems. However, most such models assume that all nodes have equal contact
with other nodes and the rate to compromise (a compromised node loses its designed
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functionality due to either a successful attack outside the network or an infection from
some of its neighbors) is largely determined by the density of the compromised nodes.
Other epidemic models, for example, Barabasi and Albert (1999), Pastor and Vespignani
(2001), Moreno et al (2002), Pastor and Vespignani (2002), Wang et al (2003a,b), etc.,
considered non-homogeneous graphs (a graph is homogeneous if any isomorphism between
nite induced subgraphs extends to an automorphism of the graph) without grasping the
fact that computers may get compromised because of their own actions such as down-
loading or executing a malicious code. Recently, by abstracting the network system as
a vulnerability graph of nodes set V and edges set E , Li et al (2011) built a stochastic
model characterizing a network system in which a node is compromised as soon as one of
its neighbors is compromised and a compromised node may get secure again by receiving
some curing operation. They proved that the probability a node gets compromised is
increasing as the random degree (i.e., the random number of edges of a node) increases
in the sense of stochastic ordering and obtained a simple lower/upper bound for this
probability.
In practical occasions, most network systems equipped with certain security software
possess some tolerance when some of its neighbors are compromised, and sometimes a
node with a few neighbors being compromised does not stop working in the proper style
until the number of compromised neighbors becomes large enough and goes beyond the
tolerance level. In view of these, this paper studies a more general stochastic model,
which characterizes the mechanism that a system is compromised and gets secure again
and analyzes some aspects of network security. This model mainly includes the following
several key aspects:
1. A vulnerability graph is used to abstract a network system with vertices repre-
senting possible vulnerabilities and edges capturing connections, through which the
exploitation of one vulnerability could lead to the exploitation of the other;
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2. An alternative renewal process is utilized to model those state changes due to attacks
over the vulnerability graph and the endeavor to cure or vaccine compromised nodes;
3. The k-out-of-n fault tolerant structure (see Kuo and Zuo, 2002) is employed to
characterize the way a node is compromised due to its neighbors or an intruder
from outside the system, this makes the model capable of modeling the network
system which is tolerant of compromised neighbors.
In this chapter, we focus on the degree distribution of the vulnerability graph which
has an important impact on the security of a network system. In fact, it is shown that the
probability for a node to be compromised increases as the degree grows in the increasing
convex ordering, which is weaker than the usual stochastic ordering. Further, new upper
and lower bounds on the probability for a node to be compromised are obtained and proved
to be both more informative in the sense of incorporating more parameters of the system
and being sharper than those in Li et al (2011). Besides, we have also conducted some
stochastic comparisons among three typical degree distributions: regular graph, random
graph, and power-law graph. The results obtained in this paper can help the designer to
determine a better degree distribution leading to a more secure system, and can also help
the engineer to well orchestrate the system congurations to make the system secure by
taking eective actions. Hopefully the results can throw some new light on tuning system
parameters so as to enhance the security. Additionally, the model abstracts vulnerability
graphs through the degree distributions and hence can handle systems with any topology.
3.2 The model
In practical situations, a network system often faces attacks (malicious codes or hackers,
etc.) from outside the system. Initially, all nodes are secure, not compromised. The
attacker tries to paralyze the system through continuously launching attacks to any secure
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nodes in the system. An attack succeeds if it penetrates the attack-prevention mechanism
such as virus or re-wall lters deployed by the corresponding machines. A successful
attack may be typically detected after a delay in time, and the system becomes secure
again through some attack-recovery mechanism. As time elapses, some nodes may get
compromised and consequently may compromise its neighbors. Those compromised nodes
may either be detected by a software (periodically scanning by the re wall) and get cured
or become secure due to vaccine and immunity. The node that got secure at some previous
time may be compromised again after being cured. This process repeats for all nodes.
Since a node may get compromised by an attack that is launched from one or multiple
neighbors, an important issue is to capture how states of those neighbors have their impact
on the state of a node itself. This helps the architect have a better understanding on the
structure of a system and achieve a better design of the network system.
For ease of reference, all notations are listed in Table 3.1.
Figure 3.1: A depiction of the evolving process of a vulnerable network
1. Vulnerability graph abstraction Denote G a nite undirected graph with node set V
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 the rate for a node with all its neighbors secure to be compromised by the
attacker;
 the rate for a node to be compromised by one compromised neighbor, usually
 > ;
 the rate for a compromised node to get secure after being detected;
 the rate for a compromised node to get secure due to vaccine or immunity;
X the time interval for a node to be in secure state during a cycle;
Y the time interval for a node to be in compromised state during a cycle;
W0 the time for the attacker to compromise a node with all neighbors secure;
Wi the time for a secure node to be infected by its compromised neighbor i;
Wr;k the rth smallest one among W1;    ;Wk, r = 1;    ; k;
V1 the time for a compromised node to get secure after being detected;
V2 the time for a compromised node to get secure due to vaccine or immunity;
q the steady state probability for a node to be compromised;
p the steady state probability for a node to be secure, p = 1  q;
D the random degree of a node in the system;
r the minimal number of compromised neighbors for a secure node to get com-
promised;
K number of compromised neighbors of a node with degree D, it has a binomial
distribution with number of trials D and the probability of success q;
st being smaller in the sense of stochastic ordering;
icx being smaller in the sense of increasing convex ordering;
bxc the largest integer which is smaller than or equal to x.
dxe the smallest integer which is not smaller than x.
 () the gamma function;
I() the index function, I(A) = 1 if A occurs and I(A) = 0 otherwise;
Pr() the probability function;
E[] the expectation function;
Table 3.1: A list of all notations employed in the model
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and edge set E 6= ;, where the size of the graph (i.e., the number of nodes) jVj > 0.
Each node v 2 V represents a vulnerability and an edge (u; v) 2 E means that
the exploitation of vulnerability u can lead to the exploitation of vulnerability v,
and vice versa. Any node v 2 V has a random degree that follows some integer-
valued distribution on fr; : : : ; jVj   1g. All nodes in the system are secure (not
compromised) at the beginning and are either secure or compromised during the
whole process.
2. Compromising mechanism Suppose that an attacker outside the system keeps
launching attacks to all secure nodes. Once a node is compromised, it becomes
an accomplice of the attacker and then threatens its secure neighbors through logic
or physical connections between them. Assume that
(i) W0 has an exponential distribution with rate  (or mean 1=),
(ii) Wi has an exponential distribution with rate , and
(iii) each secure node has a compromising tolerance level, say r (See Table 3.1).
That is, a node with more than r neighbors becomes compromised (and thus
loses the capability of functioning in designed manner) when r of its neighbors
are compromised.
3. Attack-detection-recovery mechanism The compromised nodes have a chance to get
secure again. Assume that
(i) V1 follows an exponential distribution with rate , and
(ii) V2 follows an exponential distribution with rate .
4. Statistical independence Assume that
(i) the attacker and his accomplices independently launch their respective attacks
to secure nodes (neighbors),
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(ii) the attack-detection system and the vaccine/immune system work indepen-
dently, and
(iii) getting compromised and getting back to secure state are independent. That is,
random variables D, W0, V1, V2, and Wi are mutually independent. It should
be noted that this by no means implies that a node to get compromised is
independent of other nodes to get compromised. By contrast, the events that
nodes get compromised are highly correlated.
3.3 Main analytical results
This section devotes to studying the probability for a node in a network system to get
compromised. We discuss its monotonicity with respect to the random degree and derive
upper and lower bounds through an implicit equation for this important security index.
3.3.1 Equation of the probability to be compromised
The state evolution of a node in the system forms an alternating renewal process (see
Ross, 1996). Each cycle of the process is composed of the time interval X corresponding
to the secure state and the time interval Y corresponding to the compromised state. In
order to measure the security of the system, we consider q, the probability for a node to
be compromised when the system enters its steady state. Intuitively, the smaller the q is,
the more secure the system is. The following theorem provides an implicit equation for
q, which is useful in the sequel to study the security mechanism of the system.
Theorem 3.3.1 For an arbitrary graph G with random degree D, the steady state prob-
ability for a node to be compromised, q, satises
1
q
  1 =  + 

E

1   (K + 1) (= +K   r + 1)
 (K   r + 1) (= +K + 1)

: (3.1)
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Proof: First, denote Wr;k the r-th order statistic based upon W1;    ;Wk, which is the
time for a node v to get compromised due to its compromised neighbors, say, 1;    ; k.
Then, the time interval for v to be secure in a cycle is [0; X] with X = minfW0;Wr;Kg.
Given K = k, W1;    ;Wk are independent and have a common exponential distribution
function
F (x) = 1  e x; for x  0.
Given K = k, Wr:k has distribution function
Fr:k(x) =
k!
(r   1)!(k   r)!
Z x
0
F r 1(t)(1  F (t))k r dF (t); x  0:
By the assumption, W0 has exponential distribution
G(x) = 1  e x; for x  0 and  > 0.
Since W0 is independent of fW1;    ;Wkg, the series structure minfW0;Wr:kg has distri-
bution function 1  G(x) Fr:k(x), and then by Fubini's theorem, we have
E

minfW0;Wr:kg

=
Z 1
0
G(x) Fr:k(x) dx
=
Z 1
0
e x

k!
(r   1)!(k   r)!
Z 1
x
F r 1(t)(1  F (t))k r dF (t)

dx
=
Z 1
0
1  e t

k!
(r   1)!(k   r)!F
r 1(t)(1  F (t))k r dF (t)
=
1

k!
(r   1)!(k   r)!
Z 1
0
yk r(1  y)r 1(1  y=) dy (y = e t)
=
1


1   (k + 1) (= + k   r + 1)
 (k   r + 1) (= + k + 1)

:
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As a result, it follows that
E[minfW0;Wr;Kg] = E

E[minfW0;Wr;KgjK]

=
1

E

1   (K + 1) (= +K   r + 1)
 (K   r + 1) (= +K + 1)

: (3.2)
On the other hand, the length of the time for a node to be compromised in a cycle,
Y = minfV1; V2g, follows an exponential distribution with rate  + . So,
E[Y ] = E

minfV1; V2g

=
1
 + 
: (3.3)
Now, by Blackwell's theorem (Ross, 1996), the steady state probability that a node is
secure equals
p =
E

minfW0;Wr;Kg

E

minfW0;Wr;Kg

+ E

minfV1; V2g
 ; (3.4)
and thus q = 1  p satises
1
q
= 1 +
E[minfW0;Wr;Kg]
E[minfV1; V2g] :
Plugging (3.2) and (3.3) into (3.4), we immediately reach the desired equation (3.1).
Intuitively, the security of a system can be improved by deploying some reactive secu-
rity mechanisms such as intrusion detection systems to increase + and/or by deploying
some proactive security mechanisms such as virus lters to decrease  and . This is jus-
tied by the following Proposition 3.3.2
Proposition 3.3.2 The probability q for a node to be compromised is
(i) decreasing with respect to  +   0, and
(ii) increasing with respect to  > 0 and  > 0.
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Proof: (i) For any xed  and , note that
0 <
 (K + 1) (= +K   r + 1)
 (K   r + 1) (= +K + 1) < 1;
and the right hand side of (3.1) increases when  +  increases. Hence q decreases with
respect to  +   0.
(ii) By  (x+ 1) = x (x) for any x > 0, it holds that
g(; ) =
1


1   (K + 1) (= +K   r + 1)
 (K   r + 1) (= +K + 1)

=
1

2666641 
rY
i=1
(K   i+ 1)
rY
i=1
(= +K   i+ 1)
377775
is decreasing in  > 0. This guarantees that q increases in  > 0.
Since
rY
i=1
(K   r + i)
 
1 +


rX
j=1
1


+K   r + j
!
<
rY
i=1
(K   r + i)
 
1 +


rX
j=1
1
K   r + j
!
=
rY
i=1
(K   r + i) + 

rX
j=1
rY
i=1;i6=j
(K   r + i)
<
rY
i=1



+K   r + i

;
by taking the partial derivative, we have
@
@
g(; )
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=
 1
2
0BBBB@1 
rY
i=1
(K   i+ 1)
rY
i=1
(= +K   i+ 1)
1CCCCA+
rY
i=1
(K   i+ 1) 
rX
j=1
rY
i=1;i6=j



+K   r + i


rY
i=1
(= +K   i+ 1)2
=
1
2
0BBBB@
rY
i=1
(K   i+ 1)
rY
i=1
 
= +K   i+ 1   1
1CCCCA+ 1
rY
i=1
(K   i+ 1) 
rX
j=1



+K   r + j

rY
i=1
(= +K   i+ 1)
=
1
2
266664
rY
i=1
(K   i+ 1)
rY
i=1
 
= +K   i+ 1
 
1 +


rX
j=1
1


+K   r + j
!
  1
377775
=
1
2
266664
rY
i=1
(K   r + i)
rY
i=1
 
= +K   r + i
 
1 +


rX
j=1
1


+K   r + j
!
  1
377775
< 0:
That is, the right hand side of (3.1) decreases and hence q increases when  increases.
3.3.2 Impact of topology on vulnerability graph
Before proceeding to investigating how the topology (i.e., the degree distribution) of a
vulnerability graph aects the probability for a node to be compromised, let us rst
introduce the following lemma.
Lemma 3.3.3 The function
Hr(k; !) = 1   (k + 1) (! + k   r + 1)
 (k   r + 1) (! + k + 1)
(i) decreases in k = r; r + 1;    , for any ! > 0, and
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(ii) is convex with respect to k = r; r + 1;    , for any !  3+r
r 1 .
Proof: (i) For any k  r,
Hr(k; !) Hr(k + 1; !)
=
 (k + 2) (! + k   r + 2)
 (k   r + 2) (! + k + 2)  
 (k + 1) (! + k   r + 1)
 (k   r + 1) (! + k + 1)
=
 (k + 1) (! + k   r + 1)
 (k   r + 1) (! + k + 1)

(k + 1)(! + k   r + 1)
(k   r + 1)(! + k + 1)   1

:
Since, for ! > 0,
(k + 1)(! + k   r + 1)  (k   r + 1)(! + k + 1) = r! > 0;
it is concluded that Hr(k; !) is decreasing in k  r.
(ii) Let the increment r(k; !) = Hr(k + 1; !) Hr(k; !). Then,
r(k + 1; !) r(k; !)
= Hr(k + 2; !)  2Hr(k + 1; !) +Hr(k; !)
=

1   (k + 3) (! + k   r + 3)
 (k   r + 3) (! + k + 3)

  2

1   (k + 2) (! + k   r + 2)
 (k   r + 2) (! + k + 2)

+

1   (k + 1) (! + k   r + 1)
 (k   r + 1) (! + k + 1)

=

2(k + 1)(! + k   r + 1)
(k   r + 1)(! + k + 1)  
(k + 2)(k + 1)(! + k   r + 2)(! + k   r + 1)
(k   r + 2)(k   r + 1)(! + k + 2)(! + k + 1)   1

  (k + 1) (! + k   r + 1)
 (k   r + 1) (! + k + 1)
=
r!(3 + 2k   r + !   r!)
(k   r + 2)(k   r + 1)(! + k + 2)(! + k + 1) :
Note that, for r  k, when 0 < !  1,
3 + 2k   r + !   r!  3 + r + !   r!  3 + ! > 0;
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and when 1 < !  3+r
r 1 ,
3 + 2k   r + !   r!  3 + k   !(r   1)  0;
it follows that, for any !  0, r(k; !) is increasing in k  r and hence Hr(k; !) is convex
with respect to k  r.
Recall for r = 1, Li et al (2011) proved that the probability for a node to be com-
promised increases as D grows in the sense of the stochastic order. Theorem 3.3.4 below
presents a more general result than Li et al (2011) regarding the eect of the degree
distribution on the security of network systems.
Theorem 3.3.4 For any arbitrary graph G with random degree D, the probability for a
node to be compromised, q, increases as D increases in the sense of the increasing convex
order.
Proof: Denote ! = = and let K =
PD
i=1 I(Ai), here Ai is the event that neighbor i
of a node is compromised (with probability q), i = 1; 2;    . Since (i) K is stochastically
increasing as D stochastically increases, and (ii) 1
q
  1 in (3.1) is decreasing with respect
to q, it suces to show that E[Hr(K;!)] is decreasing as K increases in the increasing
convex order.
By Lemma 3.3.3, Hr(k; !) is both decreasing and convex in k = r; r + 1;    . Note
that the expectation of any increasing and convex function preserves the increasing con-
vex order. It follows immediately that E[Hr(K;!)] is decreasing as K increases in the
increasing convex order. This completes the proof.
Remark 3.3.5 Theorem 3.3.4 simply claims that the steady state probability for a node
to be compromised becomes larger if the degree of a network topology becomes larger.
This could provide the engineer with an insight to improve the security of an existing
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system: amend the system's topology and choose a topology with smaller random degree
in the sense of the increasing convex order.
As an example of Theorem 3.3.4, let us now look at three topologies, which are very
common in practice. Here, the degree of a node is the number of its neighbors, an integer-
valued random variable. Readers may refer to Bollobas (2001) and Caldarelli (2007) for
more details.
 Regular graph: The degree D of a node follows a degenerate distribution
Pr(D = )  1; for some integer  < jVj;
 Random graph: The degree D of a node follows a binomial distribution
Pr(D = d) =
jVj   1
d

 d(1  )jVj d 1;
for d = 0; 1;    ; jVj   1, here  is the edge probability and all edges in the graph
are mutually independent;
 Truncated power law graph: The degree D`; of a node follows the distribution
Pr(D`; = d) =
(d+ 1) (+1)
jVj 1X
k=`
(k + 1) (+1)
;
for d = `; `+ 1;    ; jVj   1, here the power-law exponent   1, and ` ( 0) is the
minimum possible degree. This is actually a transformation (one unit to the left) of
the truncated version of the ordinary power law distribution with
Pr(D = d) =
`
d+1
; for d = `; `+ 1;    .
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Proposition 3.3.6 below can be easily proved and hence is stated without proof.
Proposition 3.3.6 (i) D`; decreases in the increasing convex ordering with respect to
;
(ii) D and D increase in the increasing convex ordering with respect to  and  ,
respectively.
To make a stochastic comparison among the above three topologies, we need the
following lemma.
Lemma 3.3.7 (Denuit et al., 2005, pp. 154) Suppose two integer-valued random vari-
ables N and M such that E[N ] = E[M ]. Denote
hN(d) =
Pr(N = d)
Pr(N = d  1) ; for d = 1; 2;    :
Then, N icx M if there exists a constant c such that hM(d)  hN(d) for d  c and
hM(d)  hN(d) for d > c.
Proposition 3.3.8 Suppose E[D] = E[D ] = E[D`; ]. Then,
(i) D icx D for any 0 <  < 1 and D icx D`; for any `  1 and   1;
(ii) D icx D0; for   1 and 0 <   0:484.
Proof: (i) It follows directly from the equation (3.A.48) of Shaked and Shanthikumar
(2007).
(ii) For d = 1;    ; jVj   1,
hD (d) =  

1   +
jVj
d(1  ) ; hD0; (d) =

1 +
1
d
 (+1)
:
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It is easy to verify that
(x) = hD (x)  hD0; (x) =  

1   +
jVj
x(1  )  

1 +
1
x
 (+1)
is continuous and strictly decreasing in x 2 [1; jVj   1].
Since 0 <  < 1 and   1, it holds that
 (1 )
1    
(1 ) and  >  2 (+1);
which is equivalent to  (1 ) > 2 (+1). Note that jVj   1    , we have
(jVj   1)
1   
 (1 )
1    
(1 ) > 2 (+1):
This implies, for 0 <  < 1 and   1,
(1) = (jVj   1) 
1     2
 (+1) > 0:
On the other hand, one can verify that (1 + ) < (1  )1=2 for 0 <   0:484. Since
(1 +  )  (1 + ) and (1  )1=2  (1  )1=(+1); for   1,
it holds that, for 0 <   0:484, (1 +  ) < (1  )1=(+1), or equivalently
 (+1)
1   < (1 + 
) (+1) :
Thus, for 0 <   0:484,
(jVj   1) = 
(jVj   1)(1  )  

1 +
1
(jVj   1)
 (+1)
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 
(1+)
(1  )   (1 + 
) (+1) < 0:
Now, due to the strict decreasing property of (x), there exists some constant c 2 (1; jVj 
1) such that hD0; (d)  hD (d) for d  c and hD0; (d)  hD (d) for d > c. Taking
E[D ] = E[D`; ] into account, it follows from Lemma 3.3.7 that D icx D0; .
Remark 3.3.9 (i) Proposition 3.3.8(i) actually holds for a random graph without the
restriction of independence among all edges.
(ii) Note that the stochastic order implies the increasing convex order. By Theorem
3.3.4 and Proposition 3.3.6, we have the following insights: For a network system, the
smaller the degree of a node (the edge probability, the exponent) of a regular graph
(random graph, power law graph) is, the more secure the system is. It should be pointed
out here that the larger the exponent of a power law graph, the lighter the tail of the
node distribution.
(iii) For a network with a moderate number of neighbors, according to Theorem 3.3.4
and Proposition 3.3.8, the regular graph is more secure than the random graph (even
without the restriction of independence among all edges), and if the network is large, the
random graph is more secure than the power-law graph. Thus, to attain more security, it
is sensible to decentralize a network, i.e., to avoid having too many edges on one node.
3.4 Probability bounds
Since the probability q for a node to be compromised is determined by the implicit equa-
tion (3.1), which is not computable because of the expectation of gamma functions, we in
this section provide lower and upper bounds for this probability.
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Proposition 3.4.1 For an arbitrary graph G with a random degree D,

 + ( + )
h
1  (E[D] + 1) b c 1
i < q < (+ (E[D] + 1))
( + (E[D] + 1)) + (+ )( + )
: (3.5)
Proof: According to Theorem 3.3.4, for a given threshold r and D, it holds that q 
(r + 1)=E[D] and hence E[K] = qE[D]  r + 1. D  K guarantees
E

K   r
K + 1

> E

K   r
D + 1

 E

1
D + 1

: (3.6)
Note that
k + s  r + 1
k + s+ 1
 k   r + 1
k + 1
; for any s  0,
we have, for any k = 1; 2;    ; jVj and the threshold r,
 (k + 1) 
 
= + k   r + 1
 (k   r + 1)  = + k + 1
  (k + 1) 
 b=c+ k   r + 1
 (k   r + 1)  d=e+ k + 1  bxc  x  dxe
=
 
k   r + b=c+ 1    (k   r + 1) 
k + b=c+ 1    (k + 1)


1  r
k + 1
b=c+1
:
Then, by (3.1), we have
1
q
  1 <  + 

E
"
1 

1  r
K + 1
b=c+1#
  + 

"
1 

1  E

r
K + 1
b=c+1#
(Jensen's inequality)
<
 + 

"
1 

E

1
D + 1
b=c+1#
(the inequality (3.6))
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  + 


1  1
(E[D] + 1)b=c+1

: (Jensen's inequality)
Thus, it follows that
q >

 + ( + )

1  1
(E[D] + 1)b=c+1
 :
On the other hand, the expectation of (3.1),
E

1   (K + 1) (= +K   r + 1)
 (K   r + 1) (= +K + 1)

= E

1  K    (K   r + 1)
(K + = + 1)    (K + =   r + 1)

> E

1 

K
K + = + 1
r
> E

= + 1
K + = + 1

>
= + 1
E[K] + = + 1
(Jensen's inequality)
 = + 1
E[D] + = + 1
: (K  D)
Then, from
1
q
  1 >  + 



+ 1
E[D] + = + 1
;
it follows immediately that
q <
[ + (E[D] + 1)]
[ + (E[D] + 1)] + ( + )( + )
;
as is just the desired.
Now, we focus on the special case with r = 1.
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In view of q  1  p, setting r = 1 in (3.1) reduces to the following equation in Li et
al (2011),
p
q
= E

 + 
 + K

=
 + 
E
h
1
+K
i 1 : (3.7)
Since the denominator 
E

1
+ K
 1
is the harmonic mean of  + K, the rate for a node to be compromised, the equation
in (3.7) tells that the odds for a node to be safe are just the ratio of the rate for a
compromised node to become secure to the harmonic mean of the rate for a secure node
to be compromised.
The following proposition presents an upper bound for q.
Proposition 3.4.2 For a graph G with any arbitrary degree distribution D and r = 1, it
holds that
q 
p
s2(; ; ; ) + 4E[D]  s(; ; ; )
2E[D]
; (3.8)
where
s(; ; ; ) =  +  +    E[D]:
Proof: Since the harmonic mean is less than or equal to the usual mean, it follows that

E

1
+ K
 1
 E[ + K] =  + E[K] = + qE[D]:
Then, by (3.7), we have
1  q
q
  + 
 + qE[D]
:
Equivalently,
E[D]q2 + (+  +    E[D])q     0:
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By some algebra, we obtain
q 
p
( +  +    E[D])2 + 4E[D]  (+  +    E[D])
2E[D]
:
This completes the proof.
To illustrate the bounds in Proposition 3.4.1, we now consider some particular values
of , , E[D] and +. Three dimensional plots of segments of new bounds are displayed
in Figure 3.2.
Remark 3.4.3 Li et al (2011) derived the following bounds on the probability for a node
to be compromised,

+  + 
 q  + E[D]
 +  +  + E[D]
: (3.9)
To compare (3.9) with (3.5) and (3.8), one can verify that

+ ( + )
h
1  (E[D] + 1) b c 1
i  
 +  + 
;
p
s(; ; ; )2 + 4E[D]  s(; ; ; )
2E[D]
  + E[D]
 +  +  + E[D]
:
Thus the lower bound in (3.5) and the upper bound in (3.8) perform better than the
corresponding ones in (3.9), respectively.
To compare the upper bounds in (3.5) and (3.8), we consider the dierence between
the upper bound in (3.8) and that in (3.5), i.e., (3.8)-(3.5). Two graphs of the dierence
for certain parameter values are provided in Figure 3.3. As can be seen, in most area,
the dierence is positive, i.e., the upper bound in (3.5) is smaller than the one in (3.8);
however, there are areas where the dierence is negative. See Figure 3.3(b) for instance.
This implies that out of these two upper bounds no one is superior to another.
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Figure 3.2: Upper bound (top) and lower bound (bottom) by (3.5)
62
(a)  +  = 1;E[D] = 4
(b)  = 16;E[D] = 4
Figure 3.3: The dierence between the upper bound in (3.8) and that in (3.5)
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3.5 Concluding remarks and future work
By taking the tolerance of compromised neighbors into consideration, we studied the
probability for a node to be compromised. This probability is proved to be increasing
as the random degree grows in the sense of the increasing convex order. Based on this
study, one can conduct comparisons among network systems with certain topology such
as, for example, regular graph, random graph and power law graph. Furthermore, the
established lower and upper bounds can be used to estimate and improve the security
indices. Of course, more studies on the proposed model remain to be done. They include
the following several aspects.
(i) After a compromised node is detected, it will get secure again when a software
patch is applied. However, if the recovery is broken, then, the software may proceed
without re-starting the repair task from the beginning again. That is, the recovery
procedure is accumulative and hence the time V1 for a compromised node to become
secure again should not be memoryless. As a result, the assumption that V1 follows
an exponential distribution is inappropriate. Some other distributions with positive
aging property may serve as a better alternative.
(ii) The abstraction of a network as a graph with certain random degree and concen-
trating on local quantities like the node's degree is a signicant step to describe
a system both empirically and analytically in realistic situations. However, this
approach relies heavily on the degree distribution, which is a very local property
of graphs. From a graph-theoretic standpoint, it is relatively easy to exhibit very
dierent graphs having the same degree distribution (Aiello et al., 2001). Recently,
the page rank function (Brin and Page, 1998) is employed to model a network. It is
of interest to consider the model based on the page rank and parallel to the random
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degree model so that some further insights may be obtained. In addition, when it
comes to global vulnerabilities related to failure spreading and cascades, more global
approaches like the spectral analysis of a graph are required. For example, Castel-
lano and Pastor-Satorras (2010) and D'Agostino et al (2011) recently showed how
even in random graph there could be a zero epidemic threshold for disease spreading
and how the assortativity changes the severity of damage spreading, respectively.
Although computationally heavy, global methods complement and compete the local
approach when more complete data on the network is available.
(iii) It is assumed that the degree of a vertex is xed once the network is congured.
However, in real world networks, it may change as time elapses, because the num-
ber of compromised neighbors varies due to the history (compromised, ever being
compromised or never being compromised) of the vertex itself. So, it is interesting
to study in future work how the theoretical results are aected by the changing de-
gree. This would bring further information on how eective various reactions to the
attack might be. In addition, the dependence among edges is an important aspect
if the focus is the statistics on the number of compromised nodes or the probability
for an infection to die out, stable regimes for the infection, or similar quantities.
(iv) Theorems in Section 3.3 do not take the following two issues into account: (i) the
degree distribution actually does not fully describe a network, and the correlation
between neighboring nodes may lead to quite dierent random networks; and (ii)
each realization of a random graph is not a homogeneous object and can contain
uctuations growing monotonically with the size of the network. Thus, infections
will not spread in a uniform way. These issues deserve to be studied in the future.
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AR codes
A.1 Codes to produce TTT plot in Figure 2.4
##Define a function to get scaled TTT plot!##
Ustat<-function(data){
value=NULL
n=length(data)
for (i in 1:n-1){
for (j in i+1:n){
if (isTRUE(data[i]<data[j])) {
value=value+data[i]}
else {value=value+data[j]}
}
}
value=2*value/(n*(n-1))
return(value)
}
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##Air-conditioning data (Proschan,1963)!##
x=c(14,14,27,32,34,54,57,59,61,66,67,102,134,152,209,230)
y=c(10,14,20,23,24,25,26,29,44,44,49,56,59,60,61,62,70,
76,79,84,90,101,118,130,156,186,208,208,310)
x=sort(x); y=sort(y); tttx=triplet(x); ttty=triplet(y)
plot(tttx)
plot(ttty, xlab="probablity", ylab="scaled total time on test")
points(tttx, col="blue")
points(ttty, col="red", pch=19)
A.2 Codes to produce TTT plot in Figure 2.5
##Define a function to get scaled TTT plot!##
Ustat<-function(data){
value=NULL
n=length(data)
for (i in 1:n-1){
for (j in i+1:n){
if (isTRUE(data[i]<data[j])) {
value=value+data[i]}
else {value=value+data[j]}
}
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}value=2*value/(n*(n-1))
return(value)
}
##Skype and yahoo data!
x=c(6,9,13,18,24,28,38,44,48,54,57,69,86,120,150,176,198,
206,234,306,400,447,502,604,708,800,1005,1560)
y=c(2,5,8,11,12,15,19,22,26,30,34,36,39,40,41,52,55,57,
56,70,83,108,117,209,306,409,530,602,845,1203,1882)
x=sort(x); y=sort(y); tttx=triplet(x); ttty=triplet(y)
plot(tttx)
plot(ttty, xlab="probablity", ylab="scaled total time on test")
points(tttx, col="blue")
points(ttty, col="red",pch=19)
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BMathematica codes
B.1 Codes to plot upper/lower bounds in Figure 3.2
lower[a ; b ; c ; d ]:= a
a+b
 
1  1
(1+d)
1+Floor[ac ]
!
upper[a ; b ; c ; d ]:= a(a+c(d+1))
a(a+c(d+1))+(a+c)b
f1 = Plot3D[lower[a; 2; c; 4]; fa; 1; 5g; fc; 1; 5g;AxesLabel! f; g;PlotRange! f0; 1g]
f2 = Plot3D[upper[a; 2; c; 4]; fa; 1; 5g; fc; 1; 5g;AxesLabel! f; g;PlotRange! f0; 1g]
Show[f1; f2]
f3 = Plot3D[lower[a; b; 1; 4]; fa; 1; 5g; fb; 2; 8g;AxesLabel! f;  + g;PlotRange!
f0; 1g]
f4 = Plot3D[upper[a; b; 1; 4]; fa; 1; 5g; fb; 2; 8g;AxesLabel! f;  + g;PlotRange!
f0; 1g]
Show[f3; f4]
f5 = Plot3D[lower[1; b; c; 4]; fb; 2; 8g; fc; 1; 5g;AxesLabel! f + ; g;PlotRange!
f0; 1g]
f6 = Plot3D[upper[1; b; c; 4]; fb; 2; 8g; fc; 1; 5g;AxesLabel! f + ; g;PlotRange!
f0; 1g]
Show[f5; f6]
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B.2 Codes to plot lower bounds in Figure 3.2
lower1[a ; b ; c ; d ]:= a
a+b+c
lower2[a ; b ; c ; d ]:= a(a+c)(a+2c)
(a+b)(a+c)(a+2c)+bd
f1 = Plot3D[lower1[a; 2; c; 4]; fa; 1; 5g; fc; 1; 5g;AxesLabel! f; g;PlotRange! f0; 1g]
f2 = Plot3D[lower2[a; 2; c; 4]; fa; 1; 5g; fc; 1; 5g;AxesLabel! f; g;PlotRange! f0; 1g]
Show[f1; f2]
f3 = Plot3D[lower1[a; b; 1; 4]; fa; 1; 5g; fb; 2; 8g;AxesLabel! f;  + g;PlotRange!
f0; 0:8g]
f4 = Plot3D[lower2[a; b; 1; 4]; fa; 1; 5g; fb; 2; 8g;AxesLabel! f;  + g;PlotRange!
f0; 0:8g]
Show[f3; f4]
f5 = Plot3D[lower1[1; b; c; 4]; fb; 2; 8g; fc; 1; 5g;AxesLabel! f + ; g;PlotRange!
f0; 0:8g]
f6 = Plot3D[lower2[1; b; c; 4]; fb; 2; 8g; fc; 1; 5g;AxesLabel! f + ; g;PlotRange!
f0; 0:8g]
Show[f5; f6]
B.3 Codes to plot upper bounds in Figure 3.3
upper1[a ; b ; c ; d ]:= a+cd
a+b+cd
upper2[a ; b ; c ; d ]:=
p
(a+b cd)2+4acd (a+b cd)
2cd
f1 = Plot3D[upper1[a; 2; c; 4]; fa; 1; 5g; fc; 1; 5g;AxesLabel! f; g;PlotRange!
f0:2; 1g]
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f2 = Plot3D[upper2[a; 2; c; 4]; fa; 1; 5g; fc; 1; 5g;AxesLabel! f; g;PlotRange!
f0:2; 1g]
Show[f1; f2]
f3 = Plot3D[upper1[a; b; 1; 4]; fa; 1; 5g; fb; 2; 8g;AxesLabel! f;  + g;PlotRange!
f0; 1g]
f4 = Plot3D[upper2[a; b; 1; 4]; fa; 1; 5g; fb; 2; 8g;AxesLabel! f;  + g;PlotRange!
f0; 1g]
Show[f3; f4]
f5 = Plot3D[upper1[1; b; c; 4]; fb; 2; 8g; fc; 1; 5g;AxesLabel! f + ; g;PlotRange!
f0; 1g]
f6 = Plot3D[upper2[1; b; c; 4]; fb; 2; 8g; fc; 1; 5g;AxesLabel! f + ; g;PlotRange!
f0; 1g]
Show[f5; f6]
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